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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FRANKLIN DUANE ROBISON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
ALLISON ROBISON and
THORPE ROBISON,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
10034

PETITION FOR REHEA'RING
BASIS FOR PETITION FOR REHEARI'NG
The respondents, Allison Robison and Thorpe
Robison, respecffully submit that fue decision of
the Court rendered herein August '1'7, 1964, reversing the judgment of the Fifth Judicial District
Court, Millard County, does not correctly assess
the facts, nor does it apply a correct 'standard of
law, and departs from previous Utah prece dent.
This Court should grant respondents' petition for
rehearing and withdraw its previous opinion.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE OPINION OF THE COURT LEAVES IN A
STATE OF CONFUSION THE LAW CONCERNING
ABSOLUTE LIABILITY.

The opinion of the court considers the issue of
whether the doctrine of absolute liability should
apply and states:
1
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"Whether dynamite is such a dangerous instrumentality depends upon the circumstances. Used in a crowded city, it of course
would be; whereas, using it on a remote area
where thel'e is little or no possibility of injury
to others, it \Vould not. In doubtful situations
between those extremes the problem must be
resolved by the answer to the question as to
whether the user should reasonably fore'See
that others might be injured. It is to be observed that even where the circumstances justify its application, this so-called rule of absolute liability has the weakness of most generalities. There are almost always exceptions
which prove them fallacious. A commonly used
example is the application of the rule to the
keeping of a wild animal, such as a chained
bear. But if the person injured has deliberately teased the anirnal, or been so reckless
of his safety as to practically invite injury,
he cannot recover. It wil'l thus be seen that
the so-called rule of "absolute liability" is not
absolute at all. Both the propriety of its application in the first instance, an'd any defenses against it, are conditioned by the limitations imposed by the fundamental standard
which pervades all tort law: the conduct of
the reasonable prudent man under the circumstances; and its procedural corollary, that
whenever there is dispute in the evidence, or
uncertainty therein, as to \vhether that standard is met, the question is for the jury to
determine.''
This sta:tement treats the instant case in a
vacuum, and leaves the trial court with no guide
lines as to the a'ppl'icable standards. 'To the extent
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the court is saying that the doctrine of absolute
liability in blasting cases is applicalble in crowded
conditions where injury may be anticipated, and not
applicable in rural areas where the risk of in'jury
to adjoining property or populous is not as great,
the court has adopted the more reasonable modern
rule. Prosser, Torts 2nd Ed., p. 3'36 ( 19'55) ; Alonso
1'. Hills, 95 Cal. App. 2d 778, '2'14 P.2d 50 (1950).
However, to the extent the court applies a "re'a;sonable prudent man" concept, it has mixed the rules of
liability. Strict 'lia:bility applies whe~her or not the
individual has acted prudenHy. Harper & James,
The La1c of Torts, Vol. 2, p. 786-787. In the event
the activity is not one encompassed by the concept
of strict iiability, then the usual theory of negligence based upon fault is applicabie. In the instant
case, the area was remote and isolated. As J us'tice
Henriod notes in his dissent, ''Flowell, in Millard
County, is about as remote as you can get."
Therefore, if the court is embracing the rule
that absolute liability is not applicable in such cases
it should have so expressed, and indicated that in
this case the trial court correctly rules that the 1doctl'ine was not applica11le and the standard to he
applied is one of negligence.
It is respectfully submitted that the majority
of the courts have failed to acknowledge that whether the standard is one of stri'ct liability or that of
a reasonable prudent man under the same or similar circumstances is a question of law for the judge
3
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and not a question of fact. The question is not
whether in fact a particular standard was violated,
but what is the applicable standard, which is a
question of law. The court seems to be saying that
the standard in a ease like this is one of negligence
- the absence of "conduct of the reasonab'le prudent man." However, because the court implies that
where strict liability exists such a si'milar standard
is applicable, the opinion is uncertain. This court
should grant rehearing and expressly determine the
standard applicable in this case - negligence, and
affirm the trial court's decision that absolute lia:bili ty is not here applicable.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT APPLY THE CORRECT
STANDARD OF LAW IN DE'TERMINING WHETHER
APPE LLANT ASSU1viE'D THE RISK.
1

At the outset, it is well to note a correction in
the court's statement. of the facts. Subsequent to
the appellant returning in the afternoon, he discussed the blasting and assisted in preparations
(A. D. 27). Thereafter, there was a successful blast.
At that time the appellant had ridden his horse back
away from the b'last site, got off his horse and g'ot
into the pickup truck. He observed that blast in the
truck (A. D. 28-29). Thereafter the unsuccessful
attempts occurred. This fact is important because
it demonstrates that initially the appellant felt it
safer to get off his horse and wait out the blast in
4
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the truck, but thereafter, even after seeing that
debris and rocks were thrown by the previous blast,
he chose to expose himself without the truck cover.
It seems fair to say that the court's present opinion
is erroneous on the f.acts on a m·a teria1 point.
The opinion of the court, in discussing the evidence comments :
''On the issue of assumption of risk, the position of the defendants is that inasmuch as
plaintiff was aware of the blasting with dynamite, and was under no necessity of remaining there, but nevertheless chose to do so, and
in fact participated in the activity himself,
he assumed the risk of the injury which occurred. They maintain that this conclusion is
so clear and certain that reasonable minds
could not differ thereon, and that accordingly,
the trial court was justified in so ruling ;as a
matter of law. The ruling undoubtedly would
be correct if the evidence demonstrated those
facts to that degree of certainty."
All the evidence before the court on the presence of the appellant, his participation, his knowledge of the effect of blasting, and the ·circumstances
of the injury ·appear in the appellant's own deposition. The facts are therefore uncontroverted. The
question then is do these facts when applied against
the appropriate law show an assumption of the risk?
Yes. At the outset it shoul'd be noted that many
other courts applying the usua'l standard of assumption of risk have held that such facts conclusively
5
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show an assumption of the risk of harm. Smith 11.
Day, 117 Fed. 956 (1902); Twohy Bros. Co. v. Ke~
pon, 21 Ariz. 606, 193 Pac. 296 ( 1920). The majority has not seen fit to indicate wherein these cases
vary from this one, and why they are not persuasive.
However, it is submitted that a much more serious
challenge can be n1ade to the majority opinion.
1

First, the court has cited Prosser, Torts 2nd
Ed., Sec. 60 (1955) as to the standard of assump~
tion of risk in strict liability cases. If as noted above
this is not a strict Iiabi'lity case, the court has app'lied an erroneous standard. If the standard is one
of "reasonable prudent men" as the opinion states
( whi'Ch is a negligence concept), then the question
of assumption of risk should be governed by usual
criteria which are set out in Jacques v. Farrimond,
T4 Utah 2d 166, 380 P;2d 133 (1963). This standard is substantially less severe than that recited in
the se~ction quoted by the court from Prosser.l As
against this statement it is obvious that as a matter
of law the appellant assumed the risk. See Jacques
v. Farrimond, supra.
Second, if the court has applied the doctrine of
absolute liability then the correct standard is that
applied in the Restatement of Torts, Sec. 52'3 which
only requires that the party have reason to know
1 This assumes that Prosser ·is correct. It is submitted a simple
reading of the cited cases does not truly support that standard.
Further a more detailed analysis wil'l show the standard has
changed since his quote, whi'ch is a restatement from his 1941 edition.
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of the risk of harm (which the court here concedes
all parties did) and ( 1) take part in the activity
(which appellant did) or, (2) bring oneself within
the area of danger (which appellant did). See especially, Harper & James, supra., Sec. 21.'5. The
appellant can only be deemed a bare licencee, and
must take the premises the way he finds them. He
was as much aware of the danger from blasting as
wPre the respondents. See also Justice Henriod~s
telling dissent quoting Restatement Second, Torts,
Sec. 52'3 (e) .
Finally, it is submitted the court creates a
serious imba:lance in this field of the law as well
as acting inconsistently. The standard imposed
against the respondent is necessarily high under any
concept, whether it be strict liability or negligence.
Certainly if the appellant is in a position to appreciate the risk involved, which he obviously was, the
same high standard must be expected of the appellant for his own safety. Reason as well as justice
demands no less. It is submitted, therefore, that this
court should issue its opinion for rehearing and affirm the trial court since appellant assumed the risk.
CONCLUSION

It is important in the administration of justice
that parties and counsel have guideUnes which are
meaningful in everyday life. The instant opinion
simply is not meaningful to trial courts or the re7
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lationships of parties in daily activity. The majority
opinion is confusing and inconsistent and should be
clarified. Further, in considering the concept of
assumption of risk the holding is neither pragmatic,
consistent, nor correct in l~aw. Rehearing should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN
by-------------------------------------------------------Rex J. Hanson
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